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YOU SAY TAKINGS, AND I SAY TAKINGS: THE 
HISTORY AND POTENTIAL OF REGULATORY 
TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
DARREN BOTELLO-SAMSON† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Few federal statutes inspire as much public reaction, both 
negative and positive, as the Endangered Species Act (“ESA” or “the 
Act”).1 Much of this attention has manifested itself in federal 
courtrooms, where litigants have tried to either expand or contract 
the scope of federal powers under the Act. Significant attention has 
been paid to the legal arguments made by those bringing litigation, 
especially those arguments that focus on the Commerce Clause.2 
While such attention is clearly merited and Commerce Clause 
challenges to ESA are far from being things of the past, such 
challenges have generally proved to be unsuccessful in federal courts. 
Those challenging the implementation of ESA occasionally turn 
toward regulatory takings challenges to combat what they see as an 
unfair imposition of a public demand on the property rights of a 
single individual. 
The concept of regulatory takings is based on the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. Whenever the government takes an 
individual’s property, it must do so under three constitutionally 
mandated guidelines: (1) the property must be put to public use, (2) 
the taking of the property must be through due process, and (3) just 
 
 † Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, Rutgers University-New 
Brunswick. 
 1. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., Sara D. Van Loh, The Latest and Greatest Commerce Clause Challenges to the 
Endangered Species Act, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 459 (2004); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate 
Threatened Species, 36 GA. L. REV. 723 (2002); Maya R. Moiseyev, Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County, 7 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 191 (2001); Omar N. White, 
The Endangered Species Act’s Precarious Perch, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215 (2000); J. Blanding 
Holman VI, After United States v. Lopez, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 139 (1995). 
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compensation must be paid to the original owner.3 When a property 
owner claims that a regulation, while leaving the property in his or 
her possession, effectively diminishes the property’s value or limits a 
particular right in that property, that owner is claiming a regulatory 
taking that demands compensation. 
While it is generally recognized on all sides of the debate that 
property rights “are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must 
yield to the police power”4 in light of certain “background principles 
of the State’s law of property and nuisance already placed upon land 
ownership,”5 the exact placement of the boundary line between 
property rights and legitimate governmental powers is hotly 
contested. At stake is the effectiveness of regulatory regimes that 
often collide with private property rights and interests: “Often the 
mere threat of a lawsuit raising a takings challenge is enough to 
dissuade legislators and city councils from passing environmental 
measures, even where the proposed regulation clearly would comply 
with judicial takings tests.”6 
This article begins by examining the statutory framework of 
ESA, which was enacted in 1973 and gave certain regulatory powers 
to federal agencies. Specifically, it provided that the United States 
Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) would regulate individual, 
commercial, and governmental activities to protect endangered 
species. Central to this statute is the prohibition of a “take,” which 
means to kill, harm, harass, capture, etc. an endangered species.7 The 
next section examines the judicial history of ESA, addressing the 
legal context in which regulatory takings challenges are currently 
fought. This article then discusses the history of regulatory takings 
jurisprudence.8 Finally, the last two sections cover the history of 
regulatory takings challenges to ESA, as well as the potential for such 
challenges in the near future. 
 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 4. Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
 5. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 6. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 1051 (2d ed. 1998). 
 7. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000). 
 8. At this point, it is important to remind the reader not to confuse the context of the term 
“take,” in the above discussed context of ESA, with the other type of “take,” which refers to the 
taking of property for which compensation is required. 
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II.  STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
Congress enacted ESA in 1973 for the stated purpose of 
“provid[ing] a means whereby the ecosystems upon which 
endangered species and threatened species depend may be 
conserved.”9 Through the enactment of the Act, Congress recognized 
that a diversity of “species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, 
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value,”10 
and declared that such threats to biodiversity are “a consequence of 
economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern 
and conservation.”11 ESA casts a wide net to promote conservation, 
focusing on everything from individual species to habitats, and from 
private citizens to the government itself. 
In Section 4, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to 
exercise powers aimed at determining the species and habitats that 
need government protection. In addition to the power to declare 
whether a particular species is endangered or threatened,12 the 
Secretary is also authorized to declare “critical habitat”13 and 
promulgate regulations necessary for the survival of the species. 
While the Act certainly grants the Secretary significant power in the 
listing of endangered and threatened species, the Act also places 
upon the Secretary guidelines and restrictions in the use of this 
power. For instance, the Act establishes a timetable for the 
declaration of petitioned species and the review of such declarations, 
making negative declarations open to judicial review.14 More 
significantly, while the Act allows the Secretary to take “into 
consideration the economic impact”15 of a critical habitat designation, 
determinations of species listings are to be made “solely on the basis 
of the best scientific and commercial data available.”16 In addition to 
these listing powers, Section 5 of the Act authorizes the Secretaries of 
Agriculture and the Interior “to acquire by purchase, donation, or 
otherwise, lands, waters, or interest therein”17 as a way to set aside 
critical habitat. 
 
 9. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
 10. Id. § 1531(a)(3). 
 11. Id. § 1531(a)(1). 
 12. Id. § 1533(a)(1). 
 13. Id. § 1533(a)(3). 
 14. Id. § 1533(b)(3). 
 15. Id. § 1533(b)(2). 
 16. Id. § 1533(b)(1). 
 17. Id. § 1534(a)(2). 
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The acquisition of habitat lands, while deemed by Congress as an 
important part of a larger policy of protecting endangered species, 
would be cost prohibitive if implemented as the sole means of 
achieving the goals of ESA. The Act, therefore, also restricts 
behaviors that further threaten endangered species. The Section 7 
provisions of ESA require that all federal agencies “insure that any 
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . [does 
not] jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification 
of habitat of such species.”18 
In addition to the Section 7 provisions regarding federal agency 
actions, Section 9 of ESA governs the actions of private individuals. 
Along with prohibiting the importation, exportation, and interstate 
sale of endangered species,19 the Act also prohibits the “taking” of 
any endangered species within the United States or upon the high 
seas by anyone under United States jurisdiction.20 While the Section 9 
prohibitions against takings can be interpreted as both broad and 
draconian, Section 10 allows for so-called “incidental takings.” In this 
section of ESA, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to 
establish Habitat Conservation Plans (“HCP”), which  allow for 
limited takings of endangered or threatened species provided that the 
“taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an 
otherwise lawful activity.”21 To acquire a permit for such takings, the 
applicant must demonstrate the incidental nature of the taking, that 
procedures will be in place to minimize the taking, and that 
alternatives have been considered but are demonstrably less 
favorable.22 These various provisions and components of ESA have 
been thoroughly examined and interpreted by the courts, thereby 
heavily embedding ESA’s statutory history within the U.S. judiciary. 
III.  ESA IN THE COURTS 
While regulatory takings challenges to ESA are a fairly recent 
phenomenon, they have not developed, nor do they take place within, 
a legal and political environment absent a contextual history. A long 
observed characteristic of the American judiciary is “that it can only 
 
 18. Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
 19. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(A, E-F). 
 20. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B-C). 
 21. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
 22. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A-B). 
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act when it is called upon, . . . it does not pursue criminals, hunt out 
wrongs, or examine evidence of its own accord.”23 This means that the 
very evolving political forces in which ESA was created was also the 
context in which its challenges occurred. Therefore, regulatory 
takings challenges arise in a context dependent upon the successes 
and failures of other challenges pursued for reasons ranging from 
changes in political climate to changes in the law itself. Whereas a 
regulatory takings challenge focuses, by legal necessity, upon a 
“concrete controversy,”24 other legal challenges may be made more 
efficacious with the addition of broader goals. For example, legal 
challenges to ESA apart from regulatory takings challenges have 
included cases involving statutory interpretation and interstate 
commerce. 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
While Congress was clear in its reasons for passing ESA,25 the 
guidelines for implementation of the Act are considerably less 
specific. Ambiguous terms leave the Secretary of the Interior with 
considerable leeway when following these congressional directives. 
The extent of this discretion, and the decisions made with it, rapidly 
brought ESA before the courts for judicial interpretation of the Act. 
Two cases stand out as foundational in shaping the way courts would 
interpret the meaning and requirements of ESA, and together they 
form “the bedrock upon which most subsequent U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service implementation actions have been based.”26 
The first of these cases involves the well known halting of 
construction of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River, an 
area that had been declared critical habitat for a small fish called the 
snail darter. In TVA v. Hill,27 construction on the nearly completed 
dam was halted by the Supreme Court despite the large amount of 
federal dollars already spent on the program and the continued 
issuance of funds by Congress, which had been made aware of the 
presence of the snail darter in committee meetings.28 Even with such 
 
 23. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 73 (Richard D. Heffner, ed. 
Penguin Books 1956) (1835). 
 24. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981). 
 25. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a-c). 
 26. Lynn Dwyer et al., Property Rights Case Law and the Challenge to the Endangered 
Species Act, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 725, 728 (1995). 
 27. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 28. Id. at 163-67. 
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economic impacts, the Court argued that an “examination of the 
language, history, and structure of the legislation under review here 
indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species to 
be afforded the highest of priorities.”29 The presumption had been 
made by all involved in the case that “operation of the Tellico Dam 
will either eradicate the known population of snail darters or destroy 
their critical habitat.”30 Since the TVA operated as a recipient of 
federal funds, judicial recourse to balancing the economic interests of 
the TVA and taxpayers to the value of an endangered species 
calculated by Congress as “incalculable” would be impossible.31 As far 
as Section 7 provisions on agency actions are concerned, TVA 
established a judicial view of ESA as a “mandate to protect species 
notwithstanding economic effects.”32 
Whereas TVA interpreted ESA as strongly enforceable against 
the actions of the federal government, a district court decision one 
year later “formally expanded the scope of the Act to nonfederal 
actions on private lands.”33 In Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land 
and Natural Resources,34 several nongovernmental organizations 
brought suit on behalf of, and in the name of, the endangered palila 
(Psittirostra bailleui), a six-inch long bird named by the FWS as a 
“high priority species.”35 The critical habitat of the palila was 
threatened by a state program that maintained feral sheep and goats 
for game-hunting purposes on the land, thereby causing over-
consumption of the plants on which the palila depends.36 
In ruling that the state program violated ESA, and that the Act 
extends federal power over the states, the District Court for the 
District of Hawaii, after considering the economic feasibility of 
removing the feral animals from the critical habitat,37 based its 
decision on two legal considerations. First, the District Court argued 
that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to establish a 
law regulating state actions regarding endangered species. Even 
though the Hawaii state program used no federal funds, and did not 
 
 29. Id. at 173. 
 30. Id. at 171. 
 31. Id. at 187. 
 32. Dwyer, supra note 26, at 728. 
 33. Id. 
 34. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979). 
 35. Id. at 987-88. 
 36. Id. at 989. 
 37. Id. at 990-91. 
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involve any species directly in interstate commerce, the Supreme 
Court had long established that intrastate actions that affect interstate 
commerce are also under federal authority.38 Although the regulation 
of wildlife has historically been regarded as falling under state 
sovereignty, the District Court found substantial precedence stating 
that when a conflict between federal and state law is present, “a 
state’s control over wildlife within its borders must yield to the 
federal commerce power.”39 Therefore, the enforceability of ESA 
extends into state jurisdiction, since the Act “preserves the 
possibilities of interstate commerce in . . . species and of interstate 
movement of persons, such as amateur students of nature or 
professional scientists who come to a state to observe and study these 
species, that would otherwise be lost by state inaction.”40 Second, the 
District Court also relied upon the Act’s citizen suit provisions, which 
give private citizens the right to sue “any . . . governmental 
instrumentality or agency.”41 By participating in federally legislated 
activities, the State of Hawaii implicitly consented to Congress’ 
abrogation of the state’s sovereign immunity.42 
These two cases together establish a judicial interpretation of 
ESA as a strongly enforceable manifestation of congressional will to 
protect endangered and threatened species, regardless of economic 
impact. Such an interpretation of ESA would not be long lived, 
however, as the interpretation of the Act underwent changes not 
from the judiciary, but from Congress itself. Public reaction to these 
two cases, in particular the well-publicized TVA decision, prompted 
Congress to review the Acts provisions on agency actions in 1978. 
Eventually Congress allowed agencies to consider economic factors, 
and in 1982, Congress established the HCP components of Section 10, 
allowing for incidental takes.43 Despite this congressional clarification, 
the courts continue to be called upon to engage in statutory 
interpretation of ESA. 
One specific area of ESA which was subjected to the statutory 
interpretation of the District Court in Palila was the Section 9 
 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
 39. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 992. See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Douglas v. 
Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
 40. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 995. 
 41. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(A) (2000). 
 42. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 987. 
 43. Dwyer, supra note 26, at 729. 
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prohibitions on the taking of endangered species.44 The Act defines 
“take” as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect.”45 While this definition is expansive, it is not clear 
that the modification of critical habitat, especially in a manner as 
indirect as not removing feral species, fits within the statutory 
definition. In Palila, the District Court relied upon federal regulations 
that expanded the definition to include “significant environmental 
modification or degradation.”46 This definition, however, comes from 
the Secretary of the Interior, not Congress. Furthermore, this 
definition was used prior to 1982,47 when Congress added incidental 
take provisions to ESA, thus allowing for a degree of habitat 
modification under the guidance of an HCP. All of this left the 
interpretation of a fundamental term of ESA up in the air. 
In 1995, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the authority of 
the Secretary of the Interior to apply the terms “take” and “harm” to 
habitat, and not just direct actions against species themselves. The 
Court’s decision in Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Community for a 
Great Oregon48 dealt with a facial challenge to the regulatory 
definition of “harm,” which includes significant habitat modification 
and degradation. Respondents in the case, an interest group 
representing logging companies and the communities and families 
that depend on the jobs they provide, “alleged that application of the 
‘harm’ regulation to the red-cockaded woodpecker, an endangered 
species, and the northern spotted owl, a threatened species, had 
injured them economically.”49 
Although the Court acknowledged that the Act’s legislative 
history demonstrates a congressional consideration and removal of 
habitat modification language from a definition of harm,50 the Court 
argued that the actual text of ESA supports the Secretary’s definition. 
The Court stated that “an ordinary understanding”51 of the word and 
the Act’s stated broad purpose52 both require an interpretation of 
harm to include habitat modification “to provide a means whereby 
 
 44. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). 
 45. Id. § 1532(19). 
 46. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 995 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2005)). 
 47. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973). 
 48. 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 49. Id. at 691. 
 50. Id. at 691-92. 
 51. Id. at 695. 
 52. Id. at 698. 
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the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened 
species depend may be conserved.”53 Furthermore, the 1982 addition 
of the incidental taking provisions led the Court to argue that 
Congress must have interpreted ESA to cover indirect, as well as 
direct, takings because an incidental direct taking would not make 
sense.54 
B. Commerce Clause Challenges 
The District Court in Palila recognized that Congress’ authority 
over the legislation of endangered species rests in its commerce 
power,55 or its constitutional authority to “regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, among the several States, and with Indian tribes.”56 
While basing the protection of endangered species, which both the 
Supreme Court and Congress have described as “incalculable,”57 on 
something as economically specific as commerce may seem tenuous, 
the Court has interpreted Congress’ Commerce Clause powers to 
extend beyond the tradable and sellable things in themselves and to 
the channels of commerce, the instrumentalities of commerce, and 
activities that substantially affect commerce.58 
Under this Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
exercised strong judicial restraint and a low level of scrutiny when 
asked to evaluate congressional authority within federal statutes 
based upon Congress’ commerce power.59 This position is favorable to 
advocates of ESA, as the low population numbers of endangered 
species, by definition, make them more susceptible to being located 
entirely within one state, thus giving rise to challenges arguing that 
the regulation of some endangered species lies outside of Congress’ 
authority. Although the Supreme Court itself has not directly 
evaluated ESA’s relation with interstate commerce, three cases 
 
 53. Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000). 
 54. Babbit, 515 U.S. at 698-99. 
 55. Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985, 999 (D. Haw. 1979). 
 56. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
 57. Tenn. Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978). 
 58. Perez v. United States, 402 US 146, 150 (1971). 
 59. See Hodel v. Va. Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 312 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring) (expressing concern over the Court’s omission of “substantial” from the 
“substantially affects” test); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 
226 (1983); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555 (1985) (“[T]he 
national political process systematically protects states from the risk of having their functions . . . 
handicapped by Commerce Clause regulations.”); Presault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (“[W]e 
must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce.”). 
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demonstrate a potential shift in the highest court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, which may weaken ESA’s defense against Commerce 
Clause scrutiny. 
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Lopez,60 
with United States v. Morrison following five years later.61 Together, 
these two cases mark a departure from the Court’s deference to 
Congress in its interpretation of the extent of its Commerce Clause 
powers. Both cases dealt with acts passed by Congress that, 
respectively, federally criminalized the possession of a firearm within 
a school zone62 and provided a federal civil remedy for victims of 
gender based violence.63 These decisions, both of which were 
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, determined that Congress had 
exceeded its constitutional reach under the Commerce Clause in 
enacting the legislation.64 Furthermore, in both cases the Court 
concluded that the questioned legislation failed to meet the Court’s 
test of substantially affecting commerce65 primarily because the 
legislation did not deal with an economic activity,66 a point 
reemphasized in the Morrison decision.67 In both opinions, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist characterized the statutes as products of a Congress 
in the historical moment of exercising “considerably greater latitude 
in regulating conduct and transactions under the Commerce Clause 
than . . . previous case law permitted.”68 
In determining that the activity in question in Lopez did not 
substantially affect interstate commerce, the Court established a set 
of factors to more fully articulate the substantial effects test. The 
Lopez substantial effects test involves determining whether the 
questioned activity is economic in nature,69 whether it contains an 
“express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to . . . an 
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce,”70 and 
 
 60. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 61. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 62. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
 63. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02. 
 64. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602. 
 65. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602. 
 66. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
 67. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; see also Jacalyn R. Fleming, Comment, The Scope of Federal 
Authority Under the Endangered Species Act: Implications for Local Land Use Planning, 65 
ALB. L. REV. 497, 506 (2001). 
 68. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556. 
 69. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
 70. Id. at 562. 
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whether the legislative history demonstrates that Congress discovered 
a connection to interstate commerce.71 Finally, the Court also 
recognized that the complexity of society connects every activity, in 
some way, to interstate activity. Therefore, the question becomes not 
whether there is a connection to interstate commerce, but to what 
degree.72 These factors are now examined in each and every judicial 
determination of the constitutionality of congressional action based 
on Commerce Clause authority.73 
The third case that may weaken ESA against Commerce Clause 
challenges is actually neither an ESA case nor a Commerce Clause 
case. In 2001, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Solid Waste 
Agency v. Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”),74 a case that 
challenged the Army Corps of Engineers as having overstepped the 
bounds established by Congress in the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). In 
this case, petitioners argued that the Army Corps’ CWA jurisdiction, 
which enables the Corps to require and issue permits for the dumping 
of dredge and fill materials into “navigable waters,”75 did not extend 
to “an abandoned sand and gravel pit,”76 which had subsequently 
filled with water and which petitioners had purchased for the 
dumping of solid waste. The Corps argued that they did have CWA 
jurisdiction because of the Corps’ “Migratory Bird Rule,” a 
promulgated regulation interpreting the CWA as extending to cover 
intrastate waters used by migratory birds.77 
The case hinged upon the interpretation of “navigable waters,” 
the term used in the Clean Water Act to define jurisdiction. In the 
majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court 
acknowledged that the term “navigable” need not be strictly 
interpreted, and it was Congress’ intention that CWA should apply to 
some waters that may not be technically navigable, such as non-
navigable tributaries to navigable waters.78 Although the Court 
argued that the Corps was not limited to a strict definition of the 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 566-67. 
 73. Sara D. Van Loh, The Latest and Greatest Commerce Clause Challenges to the 
Endangered Species Act: Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 459, 464-65 (2004). 
 74. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 75. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000). 
 76. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162. 
 77. Id. at 164. 
 78. Id. at 172; see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
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word, the Court also pointed out that “it is one thing to give a word 
limited effect and quite another to give it no effect whatever.”79 
To determine the accuracy of the Corps’ statutory interpretation, 
the Court turned to its own Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 
declaring that when “an administrative interpretation of a statute 
invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear 
indication that Congress intended that result.”80 Citing its own recent 
Lopez and Morrison decisions, the Court evaluated the Corps’ claim 
that “the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ falls within Congress’ power to 
regulate intrastate activities that ‘substantially affect’ interstate 
commerce.”81 While not answering definitively whether migratory 
birds have a substantial nexus with interstate commerce, the Court 
stated that the “arguments raise significant constitutional questions.”82 
Therefore, while the Court did not answer whether the protection of 
various types of species would pass Commerce Clause muster, it may 
have tipped its hand by declaring such issues to be, at least, at the 
“outer limits of Congress’ power.”83 
Despite the evolution of Supreme Court Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence to a state of increased scrutiny of Congress’ commerce 
power, ESA has not been weakened in the courts by Commerce 
Clause challenges. The primary reason is that the Supreme Court has 
not heard any Commerce Clause challenges to ESA. Lower federal 
courts have, however, heard such challenges, and have ruled that 
various applications of ESA are not only within Congress’ Commerce 
Clause power, but are also consistent with the Lopez and Morrison 
decisions. 
Shortly after Lopez, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
heard National Ass’n of Home Builders (“NAHB”) v. Babbitt, 84 a case 
brought by the County of San Bernardino, CA, against the FWS. The 
County challenged the constitutionality of hospital construction 
requirements meant to protect the endangered Delhi Sands Flower-
Loving Fly. While there were some disagreements between the 
 
 79. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 173. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 172. 
 84. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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majority and concurring opinions,85 a concise argument upholding 
ESA against the Commerce Clause challenge remained. 
Most significant was the conclusion that ESA satisfied the 
substantial effects test. The D.C. Circuit Court first looked to the 
congressional record of the Act, which was not available to the Court 
in Lopez, and determined that Congress had envisioned a connection 
between the preservation of genetic diversity and interstate 
commerce.86 This satisfied one of the factors that the Lopez decision 
established for the substantial effects test, but a rational basis for 
Congress’ decision was still needed to consider the actions 
constitutional. The D.C. Circuit Court argued that Congress could 
regulate the taking of endangered species “as an activity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce because it is the product of 
destructive interstate competition, . . . [which] Congress is empowered 
to act to prevent.”87 To further satisfy the Lopez criteria for the 
substantial effects test, a footnote pointed out the jurisdictional limit 
to ESA, stating that the Act only “prevents activities that are likely to 
cause the elimination of species.”88 All of these factors were used 
together by the D.C. Circuit Court to hold the challenged 
enforcement of ESA consistent with the substantial effects test. 
According to Jacalyn R. Fleming, “[t]his was a reasonable 
interpretation of Lopez. However, since Morrison, [which further 
emphasized the need for an activity to be economic in nature to 
satisfy the substantial effects test,] the argument that the activity 
being regulated need not be economic in nature is more difficult to 
make.”89 
Faced with the Supreme Court’s reiteration of the economic 
components of its substantial effects test, lower courts continued to 
find enforcement of ESA to be constitutional by focusing on the 
economic and commercial nature of the protection of endangered 
species. Shortly after the Morrison decision, the Fourth Circuit Court 
 
 85. For example, the majority opinion found the Act protected the channels of interstate 
commerce (id. at 1046), whereas the concurring opinion did not. Compare id. at 1048, with id. at 
1058. Furthermore, the majority opinion considered endangered species as “potential 
resources.” Id. at 1051. However, the concurring opinion considers this “incalculable.” Id. at 
1058. For a full conversation on the various opinions in Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, see 
Fleming, supra note 67, at 406. 
 86. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1051. 
 87. Id. at 1054. 
 88. Id. at 1052. 
 89. Fleming, supra note 67, at 511. 
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of Appeals heard Gibbs v. Babbitt,90 which involved a FWS regulation 
limiting the taking of endangered red wolves on private land. In 
considering whether the challenged regulations substantially affected 
interstate commerce, the Fourth Circuit Court expansively read the 
economic requirements of Lopez and Morrison. As the court noted, 
“[a]lthough the connection to economic or commercial activity plays a 
central role in whether a regulation will be upheld under the 
Commerce Clause, economic activity must be understood in broad 
terms.”91 This reading was seen as consistent with Lopez and 
Morrison because the activities in those cases were only tenuously 
related to economic activity and were in areas traditionally reserved 
for states’ police powers.92 With this reading of the substantial effects 
test, the Fourth Circuit Court found a plain and direct relationship 
between the protection of red wolves and commercial activity: 
Farmers were shooting wolves for economic reasons (protecting 
livestock), and activities such as tourism, research, and the pelt trade 
are directly connected to the wolves.93 
More recently, two federal appellate decisions, Rancho Viejo v. 
Norton94 and GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton,95 argued before 
the Courts of Appeals for the D.C. District and the Fifth Circuit, 
respectively, further challenged the constitutionality of the 
application of ESA to intrastate species. In Rancho Viejo, the 
protection of the endangered arroyo southwestern toad by FWS 
conflicted with a proposed real estate development. “Rather than 
accept an alternative plan proposed by the Service, Rancho Viejo 
filed suit challenging the application of the Endangered Species 
Act . . . to its project as an unconstitutional exercise of federal 
authority under the Commerce Clause.”96 Likewise, the GDF Realty 
conflict involved development plans hampered by the presence of 
endangered species—six species of cave dwelling invertebrates.97 
Instead of denying outright the incidental take permits for which the 
petitioners applied, FWS communicated to the petitioners that the 
 
 90. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 91. Id. at 491. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 492. 
 94. 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 95. 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 96. Ranch Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1064. 
 97. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 625 (referring to the Bee Creek Cave Harvestman, the Bone 
Creek Harvestman, the Tooth Cave Pseudoscorpion, the Tooth Cave Spider, the Tooth Cave 
Ground Beetle, and the Kretschmarr Cave Mold Beetle). 
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proposed development would result in a take, and the permits would 
be denied. However, no denials were ever issued, effectively 
preventing petitioners from challenging FWS permit denials.98 After 
being compelled by a district court ruling to either issue the denials or 
state alternatives that would allow the permits to be granted,99 FWS 
denied the permits and, subsequently, GDF Realty challenged the 
constitutionality of those actions.100 
In both cases, lower court decisions stating that the application of 
ESA to intrastate species is within the bounds of Congress’ 
Commerce Clause powers were affirmed.101 Interestingly, “the courts 
used very different rationales in coming to their conclusions—the 
Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the reasoning used by the D.C. 
Circuit. The key distinction between the courts’ rationales is their 
diverging definitions of the ‘regulated activity’ for the purposes of 
ascertaining the impact on interstate commerce.”102 
In Rancho Viejo, the D.C. Circuit Court defined the activity 
regulated by ESA in this instance to be the actual construction of the 
housing development, which the court further described as a clearly 
economic enterprise. Thus, the Lopez emphasis on economic 
activities being more suitable for the substantial effects test was 
satisfied.103 The D.C. Circuit Court found neither a jurisdictional 
element to ESA, nor congressional findings connecting housing 
development construction to interstate commerce. The court, 
however, declared that these factors, when absent, are not fatal to a 
substantial effects argument.104 The more than attenuated relationship 
between interstate commerce and commercial development provided 
the court a rational basis to accept the existence of such a 
relationship.105 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit declared that the regulated activity 
“is plaintiffs’ alleged take of the Cave Species by their planned 
development of the Property.”106 While the court recognized the 
essential connection between the construction of the proposed 
 
 98. Id. at 626. 
 99. GDF Realty, Ltd. v. United States, No. 98-CV-772 (W.D. Tex. 1998). 
 100. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 626. 
 101. Id. at 624; Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1064. 
 102. Van Loh, supra note 73, at 461-62. 
 103. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1068. 
 104. Id. at 1068-69. 
 105. Id. at 1069-70. 
 106. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 633 (emphasis added). 
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development and subsequent taking of endangered species, the court 
specified that, although “the effect of regulation of ESA takes may be 
to prohibit such development . . . , Congress, through ESA, is not 
directly regulating commercial development.”107 
The Fifth Circuit provided two arguments to justify its decision 
to treat the taking of cave species as the regulated activity, as opposed 
to the actual development of the habitat. First, the court argued that 
classifying the commercial development of the property as the 
regulated activity, “would ‘effectually obliterate’ the limiting purpose 
of the Commerce Clause.”108 Given the clearly economic nature of 
real estate development, such an interpretation would enable 
Congress to “pile inference upon inference”109 and infinitely extend its 
constitutional power, resulting in a jurisprudence under which the 
facial challenges in Lopez and Morrison would fail.110 Second, the 
court was concerned that such an analysis would establish a strict 
foundation of congressional authority over commercial actors, while 
leaving noncommercial actors unaffected.111 This would be 
inconsistent with Congress’ intent in ESA, an act that protects 
endangered species from commercial and noncommercial activities, 
such as “a homeowner clearing brush from her property . . . [or a] 
lone hiker in the woods who may inadvertently harm an endangered 
species.”112 
In arguing that the direct regulation of the taking of endangered 
species substantially affects interstate commerce, the Fifth Circuit 
provided both direct and indirect effects. Regarding direct effects on 
interstate commerce, the court argued that a substantial degree of 
interstate travel of research scientist exists for these species, but 
found claims for the possibility of future economic use of these 
species to be too hypothetical and too attenuated.113 Although the 
cave species have no commercial value,114 the taking of the cave 
species would indirectly, but substantially, affect interstate commerce 
when one considers the aggregate of such a taking with all other such 
 
 107. Id. at 634. 
 108. Id. (citing Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 
(1937)). 
 109. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
 110. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 635. 
 111. Id. at 634. 
 112. Van Loh, supra note 73, at 480. 
 113. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 637-38. 
 114. Id. at 625. 
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takings. ESA, as a whole, is economic in nature, given Congress’ 
substantial concern with the commercial impacts, among others, of 
species extinction.115 The regulation of even commercially valueless 
species is an essential component of that regulatory scheme, because 
the role such species play ecologically is key to ESA’s central concern 
for ecosystem health.116 For this reason, the Fifth Circuit argued that 
the regulation of the taking of the cave species passed Commerce 
Clause muster. 
The Supreme Court has not evaluated Commerce Clause 
challenges to ESA, either facially or as pertaining to specific instances 
of its implementation. Defenders of ESA may consider this a victory 
by default, albeit a temporary one. However, even in an atmosphere 
of heightened scrutiny for acts of Congress, lower courts have been 
quite reluctant to rule that the regulation of endangered species is 
outside of Congress’ constitutional authority under the Commerce 
Clause. While dissenting opinions were issued in NAHB and Gibbs, 
those dissents focused on a perceived lack of a connection between 
interstate commerce and the specific challenged activities, but still 
allowed for an “obvious economic character and impact . . . with 
other wildlife resources.”117 The lower courts’ reluctance to declare 
the enforcement of ESA unconstitutional on Commerce Clause 
grounds should neither be overstated nor guaranteed, as more 
Commerce Clause challenges continue to be heard in lower courts.118 
However, the grounds of precedence may not be as frozen as 
often perceived. The Supreme Court, despite issuing in a new era of 
heightened scrutiny, has demonstrated a willingness to strongly 
construct federal commerce power against state power, even in policy 
areas frequently considered as traditional state powers.119 
Furthermore, a judicial environment full of precedence supporting 
ESA against Commerce Clause challenges may direct challengers to 
other avenues perceived as more inviting to challenges to ESA. 
 
 115. Id. at 639. 
 116. Id. at 640. 
 117. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 508 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Fleming, supra note 67, at 
512-14, 518. 
 118. See, e.g., Drake v. Norton, No. 04-CV-01147 (C.D. Utah 2004) (case dismissed Oct. 28, 
2005). 
 119. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (declaring that state laws prohibiting 
the direct sale of wine from out of state producers violate the Commerce Clause and the Webb-
Kenyon Act); Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005) (declaring the Commerce Clause enables 
Congress to outlaw production of medical marijuana even where state law allows it). 
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IV.  JURISPRUDENCE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS 
The origins of regulatory takings lie in the Fifth Amendment 
protection of property rights, which prohibits “private property 
be[ing] taken for public use, without just compensation.”120 This 
constitutional protection clearly requires compensation when the 
government uses its eminent domain powers to physically seize 
private property for public use. However, the Amendment has been 
increasingly interpreted to include nonphysical takings of property, 
where regulations leave property in the hands of the owner but either 
remove  economic value or particular types of property rights. 
When a property owner believes that such regulations have 
basically taken his or her property, the owner can argue that the 
government action does not properly serve a public purpose, is not 
rationally related to the government’s stated ends, imposes an unfair 
private burden in the achievement of such public ends, and/or has not 
satisfied basic procedural requirements.121 In such instances, the 
owner should be compensated for his or her loss. With the high 
incidence of endangered species on private lands and the often high 
level of costs needed to protect such species, the potential for 
conflicts between the enforcement of ESA and private property rights 
is rather great.122 While “the legal tests of validity and invalidity are 
indeed not clear,”123 an overview of the Supreme Court’s self-
admittedly inconsistent regulatory takings jurisprudence124 is possible 
and can help put that potential into perspective. 
Although the ability of property owners to seek compensation 
for government intrusion upon their property dates as far back as the 
Bill of Rights, such litigation has been rare throughout the majority of 
American history. Indeed, “[f]ew cases were litigated under the 
clause, and there was no such thing as a ‘regulatory taking’ . . . 
although state and local governments had been regulating private 
land uses, sometimes quite stringently, since the colonial era.”125 In 
the rare occurrence of a regulatory taking claim, early federal courts 
were unwilling to engage in judicial review under the Fifth 
 
 120. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 121. PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 1037-38. 
 122. Robert Innes et al., Takings, Compensation and Endangered Species Protection on 
Private Lands, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 35-52 (1998). 
 123. PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 1051. 
 124. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 125. DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP 
INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 155 (2002) (citations omitted). 
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Amendment. In 1887, a Kansas statute prohibiting the production of 
alcohol was challenged before the Supreme Court as a taking of 
private property.126 Although the Court emphasized that such a 
remedy should be sought in the state courts,127 the Court also declared 
that the “right to compensation . . . of private property taken for 
public uses is foreign to the subject of preventing or abating public 
nuisances.”128 The earliest regulatory takings cases also demonstrate 
an acknowledgement of the limits of private property and a 
recognition of a nuisance exception to the takings clause. 
The Supreme Court’s first effort at qualifying the nuisance 
exception occurred in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon129 in 1922. This 
decision declared that the Kohler Act, a Pennsylvania statute 
requiring coal companies to leave enough coal as not to threaten the 
surface structure, constituted a compensable taking. Takings 
jurisprudence would henceforth be seen as a balancing act focusing 
on the “extent of the diminution.”130 While still providing nothing 
more than vague generalities, Pennsylvania Coal established the 
regulatory takings framework under which future conflicts would be 
fought. “The general rule at least is that while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”131 
Although the Supreme Court continues to recognize the 
simultaneous claims of property owners to their property rights and 
governments to their need to regulate property, the Court has 
articulated tests to measure this balance more specifically than simply 
asking whether the state has “gone too far.” After seeing its 
regulatory takings jurisprudence as being based on “essentially ad 
hoc, factual inquiries,”132 the Court declared that it had historically 
“been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when 
‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public 
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain 
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”133 
 
 126. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
 127. Id. at 672. 
 128. St. Louis v. Stern, 3 Mo. App. 48, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1876); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 667. 
 129. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 130. Id. at 413. 
 131. Id. at 415 (emphasis added). 
 132. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 133. Id. See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). 
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The Court, therefore, established the three-pronged Penn 
Central test: Whether government action constitutes a compensable 
taking depends on (1) the economic impact of the regulation, (2) its 
interference with investment-backed expectations, and (3) the nature 
of the government’s action, ranging from outright invasion to 
protection of the common good.134 These tests are, of course, heavily 
dependent upon interpretation and have given the Court ample 
opportunity to produce rulings with a high degree of variance: 
First, the Court has defined each factor in a variety of ways, without 
acknowledging the shifts in definition. Second, it is difficult to 
predict what weight the Court will give to each factor. At different 
times the Court has actually regarded each one of these so-called 
“factors” as dispositive of whether a taking occurred.135 
Two years after establishing its Penn Central test, the Court 
established a new, two-pronged takings test, referred to as the Agins 
test.136 This test required the state to “substantially advance legitimate 
state interests” and to not “den[y] an owner economically viable use 
of his land.”137 The purpose of this new test and its relationship to 
Penn Central was not clarified, and subsequent use of the test failed 
to establish a proper interpretation of both parts of the Agins test and 
their relationship to one another.138 Furthermore, the Court 
demonstrated confusion regarding the priority of each test over the 
other. 
In a series of cases heard in the 1980s, the Court considered 
whether a number of property limiting regulations affected takings. In 
1981, the Supreme Court evaluated a facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 
of 1977.139 In determining whether environmental regulations that 
limited the extent of coal mining essentially took property from 
owners of coal mineral rights, the Court used the Agins test, asking 
whether the “economically viable use” of the land is denied to the 
owner.140 Additionally, in a partial dissent in Pennell v. City of San 
Jose, Justice Scalia argued that the Agins test should be used to find a 
 
 134. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 135. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I—A 
Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1317 (1989). 
 136. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
 137. Id. at 260. 
 138. Peterson, supra note 135, at 1328-30. 
 139. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981). 
 140. Id. at 296. 
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taking in certain rent control ordinances.141 However, in cases dealing 
with zoning ordinances142 and pesticide data disclosure,143 the Court 
relied on Penn Central. 
Despite such inconsistencies, certain trends are evident in this 
period of regulatory takings jurisprudence. The most obvious trend is 
a strong spirit of judicial deference to lawmaking bodies when 
determining whether a regulation or statute provides a public use, an 
inquiry required by both the Fifth Amendment and the first prong of 
the Agins test. While determining whether the regulation of private 
property satisfied the public use requirement, the Court regarded the 
term “public use” as coterminous with state police powers, and 
deferred to the reasoning of state legislatures as better able to 
determine whether such a requirement has been met.144 The Court 
further demonstrated a strong commitment to the ripeness standard, 
requiring that cases demonstrate a “concrete controversy.”145 In 
addition, property owners were required to receive a final decision 
from the agency and seek a possible variance to the regulation, which 
would allow the public good to be sought while leaving the property 
owner with economic productivity.146 One consequence of the Court’s 
focus on ripeness in regulatory takings cases is that the strategic use 
of the Takings Clause as the foundation for constitutional challenges 
to entire pieces of regulation has not been successful. 
Victories have been achieved lately, however, at the Supreme 
Court level by advocates of strong private property rights. With these 
victories comes a jurisprudential shift in regulatory takings cases 
visible in four areas: (1) the level of judicial deference, (2) the role of 
economics, (3) the understanding of the nature of property, and (4) 
the degree of scrutiny applied to questions of ripeness. This string of 
recent cases, beginning in the late 1980s, has been argued in an 
atmosphere less deferential to state legislatures and agencies, which 
seek to create and enforce policies that limit the use of private 
property. 
 
 141. 485 U.S. 1, 18 (1988). 
 142. See, e.g., Williamson County Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 
(1985); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986). 
 143. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984). 
 144. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 
at 1014. 
 145. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295; see also Pennell, 485 U.S. at 10. 
 146. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186; MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 348. 
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In 1987, the Court considered whether a requirement by the 
California Coastal Commission that a specific property owner provide 
lateral beach access as a condition to a building permit for a parcel of 
beachfront property affected a taking.147 Instead of interpreting the 
Commission’s discretion as coterminous with its power to protect the 
common good in coastal land, the Court evaluated the wisdom of the 
Commission’s policy, and determined that a lateral easement served 
neither the function of beach access nor the elimination of 
psychological barriers to such access, as claimed by the Commission.148 
Five years later, the Court would provide a clear justification for 
its willingness to second guess the policy decisions of legislatures and 
agencies when those decisions limit a property owner’s use of his or 
her property.149 Such limits are generally justified as serving not only a 
public purpose, but also the essential purpose of preventing harm to 
the public and its property. The Court argued, however, that “[s]ince 
such a justification can be formulated in practically every case, this 
amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff.”150 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has taken on the self-imposed 
responsibility of doing “more than insist upon artful harm-preventing 
characterizations.”151 
Although the Court became decidedly less likely to facially 
accept a state’s argument that it was preventing a public harm and, 
therefore, was not constitutionally required to compensate the 
property owner, this did not mean that states were prohibited entirely 
from such actions. The Court continues to recognize the limited 
nature of property rights, and further recognizes uncompensated 
limits can be placed upon property “if the logically antecedent inquiry 
into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use 
interests were not part of his title to begin with.”152 In other words, the 
right to endanger the public is not part of the bundle of rights in a 
specific piece of property; therefore, when such action is regulated 
away, property owners deserve no compensation, because what was 
taken was not the property owner’s in the first place. 
The recent willingness of the Supreme Court to limit property by 
such means, however, should not be overstated. The Court has stated 
 
 147. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 148. Id. at 839-40. 
 149. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 150. Id. at 1025, n.12. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1027. 
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that “[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed 
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the 
restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property 
and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”153 In addition to 
limiting the nature of harms legislatures and agencies can declare, the 
Court also established standards by which policies aimed at 
protecting the public from such harms could limit property rights.154 
While prior decisions looked for a rational basis to justify policies that 
limit private property, the Dolan Court introduced a stricter scrutiny 
for evaluating such policies.155 Short of supplying a precise 
mathematical calculation, the Court now requires a policy to 
demonstrate a “rough proportionality” between the nature of the 
prevented harm and the extent of the requirements placed upon 
property owners.156 
Increased scrutiny placed upon governments and their ability to 
limit the use of private property is indicative of a Court that has 
shifted its understanding of the nature of property and increased the 
significance of economic factors within that understanding. While the 
Penn Central and Agins tests stress both economic factors and the 
nature of regulatory action, including that which is regulated and the 
manner in which it is regulated, the Rehnquist Court increased the 
emphasis on the economic impacts of regulation in determining the 
existence of a regulatory taking, much in the way that it increased its 
emphasis on the economic nature of legislation in its Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.157 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court took a 
step toward clarifying the relationship between economic and 
noneconomic factors in regulatory takings cases.158 While property 
rights remain limited in the face of background principles of the 
common good, a per se taking occurs when regulation deprives the 
owner of all economically viable uses of the property.159 The Court 
was particularly interested in protecting property in land, arguing that 
the “historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has 
become part of our constitutional culture” is inconsistent with the 
 
 153. Id. at 1029. 
 154. Id. at 1027. 
 155. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390 (1994). 
 156. Id. at 391. 
 157. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. 
 158. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-30. 
 159. Id. at 1020. 
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elimination by regulation of all economic value,160 that is, without 
compensation. 
The Court does give examples of land uses that could be legally 
prohibited, even to the point of a total economic loss, which would 
not require compensation.161 Such regulations limit the use of 
property to those uses that do not harm others or their property and 
simply “make the implication of those background principles of 
nuisance and property law explicit.”162 As stated above, however, such 
limitations on property cannot be “newly legislated,”163 leaving it 
unclear how a legislature can make background principles explicit, 
while also strengthening takings claims by property owners who can 
demonstrate a complete economic loss. 
This increased focus on the role of economic factors in regulatory 
takings cases is correlated with a shift in the Court’s doctrine on the 
nature of property. Throughout the history of its regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, the Court has sought the balancing of private property 
rights and public interests. One of the most significant facets of 
property rights considered by the Court is the right to exclude others, 
which the Court has regarded as “one of the most essential sticks in 
the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”164 
In cases involving outright physical occupation, the Court has 
generally required the use of the states’ eminent domain powers and 
the compensation of property owners.165 In cases involving transition 
across private property, instead of physical occupation on such 
property, to guarantee public access to some public good, the private 
property right has been weighted more heavily by the Court in recent 
decisions.166 Furthermore, the Court has regarded development as 
land’s “essential use,”167 requiring governments to provide stronger 
defenses for public and environmental protections. 
During the aforementioned period of judicial deference in 
regulatory takings cases, the chronological order of the acquisition of 
property and the imposition of a regulatory limit on the use of 
 
 160. Id. at 1028. 
 161. Id. at 1029. 
 162. Id. at 1030. 
 163. Id. at 1029. 
 164. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
 165. See id. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 166. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994). 
 167. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)). 
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property affected the legitimacy of a taking claim. Acquiring property 
under pre-existing regulations was generally understood as 
preventing the owner from having reasonable investment-backed 
expectations.168 This so-called “notice rule” functions to define the 
background principals of property alluded to in Lucas by claiming 
that, “the underlying background principles of property must include 
all existing regulatory constraints at the time of acquisition.”169 
Under such jurisprudence, property rights are positive rights, 
with origins in political processes, and the Takings Clause exists as a 
foundational law that governs the further maintenance of those rights. 
This position, however, has been recently challenged by the Court, 
which has stated that if the notice rule exception is seen as absolute, 
then “the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of 
its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how 
extreme or unreasonable [and a] State would be allowed, in effect, to 
put an expiration date on the Takings Clause.”170 By explicitly 
rejecting a Hobbesian understanding of the relationship between the 
state and property, and accepting a Lockean construction,171 the Court 
has placed property rights into the realm of natural rights, which exist 
independent of and prior to the state. 
It should be stated that the majority in Palazzolo, in keeping the 
seemingly required ambiguity found throughout regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, provided confusion over the role of the notice rule in a 
pair of concurring opinions. While the majority determined that 
Palazzolo’s acquisition of the property after the regulations had been 
enacted did not proscribe his taking claim, Justices Scalia and 
O’Connor disagreed as to the role of chronology more generally. 
Justice Scalia argued that timing has no bearing on the question, 
claiming that “[a] Penn Central taking . . . is not absolved by the 
transfer of title.”172 While Justice O’Connor agrees that post-
enactment acquisition of title is “not talismanic under Penn 
Central,”173 she did not appear ready to fully reject the notice rule, 
arguing that “the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant 
 
 168. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006 (1984). 
 169. James S. Burling, Private Property Rights and the Environment After Palazzolo, 30 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 31 (2002). 
 170. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 173. Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of 
[investment-backed] expectations.”174 
Finally, rulings in regulatory takings cases by the Rehnquist 
Court have potentially altered the environment in which the Court 
considers the question of ripeness, or whether a case is ready for 
review. The jurisprudence of regulatory takings demonstrates a 
tendency of the judiciary to view itself as a last resort to resolving 
takings questions, preferring to allow other branches of government 
to resolve the issue first. Prior ripeness decisions by the Court have 
supported this view, requiring that a taking claimant demonstrate a 
concrete controversy175 and a final administrative decision, exhausting 
alternative options,176 before the case can be judicially decided on the 
merits. By and large, these same rules and requirements have 
remained as guidelines for the current Court, and were used to 
declare Palazzolo ripe, since “the government entity charged with 
implementing the regulations [had] reached a final decision regarding 
the application of the regulations to the property at issue.”177 
Furthermore, subsequent plan filing was not required, according to 
the Court, because the “unequivocal nature” of the wetlands 
regulations would not have permitted any building in the disputed 
area.178 
Some view the Palazzolo decision as a shift in the Court’s 
ripeness jurisprudence that benefits regulatory taking claimants, 
noting “that once a landowner has a meaningful permit application 
denied, the burden shifts to the government to indicate what, if any, 
other uses of the property may be available.”179 There is little 
evidence supporting this position, however, and the Court’s focus on 
the state’s strict regulations, with little administrative leeway, makes 
Palazzolo a “specific ripeness ruling [which] is tied to the facts of the 
case and is thus unlikely to have much precedential effect adverse to 
government officials.”180 
 
 174. Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 175. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981); 
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 10 (1988). 
 176. See Williamson County Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985); 
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). 
 177. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001) (quoting Williamson County, 473 
U.S. at 186). 
 178. Id. at 619. 
 179. Burling, supra note 169, at 23. 
 180. Timothy J. Dowling, On History, Takings Jurisprudence, and Palazzolo: A Reply to 
James Burling, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 65, 84 (2002). 
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The ruling in Palazzolo does not fundamentally alter the Court’s 
ripeness jurisprudence. In fact, the Court “emphatically reaffirmed its 
existing ripeness doctrine as set forth in Williamson County, 
MacDonald, and other leading ripeness precedents.”181 Furthermore, 
the Court has subsequently defended its ripeness doctrine in light of 
claims of temporary takings. Historically, the Court has stated that 
temporary restrictions must involve “extraordinary delays” instead of 
“mere fluctuations” in value before the claim can achieve ripeness.182 
After Palazzolo, the Court ruled that even lengthy and complete 
building moratoria can be justified due to “[t]he interest in facilitating 
informed decisionmaking by regulatory agencies.”183 Therefore, 
despite shifts in the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence that 
have placed stricter scrutiny upon governmental actions that seek to 
limit private property, the presence of a final administrative decision 
must still be present for a taking claim to be considered ripe. 
Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the majority’s finding in Palazzolo 
that a final decision had been made. Neither can one ignore the 
voices of dissenting justices still on the bench in cases where such 
claims have been ruled not ripe.184 While the rules of ripeness have 
not changed, there is clearly wide disagreement between the 
individual justices as to what level of agency action satisfies those 
rules, which makes the ripeness doctrine highly susceptible to even 
slight changes in justices’ philosophies or the composition of the 
Court. 
V.  REGULATORY TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO ESA 
While Commerce Clause and regulatory takings challenges to 
ESA may functionally act in political concert seeking the same end—
lessening the federal government’s authority over endangered species 
protection—the legal arguments behind each challenge are 
fundamentally different. When a Commerce Clause challenge to ESA 
is made, plaintiffs argue that, in at least a particular instance, the 
enforcement of ESA is outside of the federal government’s authority, 
which rests on Congress’ power over interstate commerce. While 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980). 
 183. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 338 (2002). 
 184. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (Burger, C.J., 
and White, J., dissenting); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (Scalia & O’Connor, JJ., 
dissenting); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 302 (Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting). 
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plaintiffs making regulatory takings challenges against ESA may also 
question the government’s authority to regulate endangered species, 
arguing that it fails to satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment, the inability to make such an argument does not 
significantly damage the regulatory takings challenge. “At issue, then, 
is not whether the federal government has the authority to protect . . . 
[endangered species] under the Endangered Species Act, but whether 
it may impose the costs of their protection solely on plaintiffs.”185 
Since the focus of such cases centers simultaneously on the 
extent of the government’s authority and the expanse of an 
individual’s property rights, different relationships between 
endangered species and property will invite different regulatory 
takings challenges. Such challenges have been made against the 
enforcement of ESA under three different types of relationships 
between endangered species and property: (1) species as property, (2) 
species as a threat to property, and (3) the regulation of property to 
protect endangered species. Such cases have been heard only before 
lower courts, not before the Supreme Court. 
A. Endangered Species as Property 
Since the ESA includes both “capture” and “collect” within its 
statutory definition of “take,”186 one would assume that regulatory 
challenges involving endangered species as property would be rather 
rare. After all, legal prohibition of such ownership would establish an 
easily recognized background principle to ownership and diminish 
any reasonable investment-backed expectation. One would have to 
challenge for the right to own an endangered species before it could 
become property that was taken by regulation. If, however, the 
particular species was already owned prior to it being protected, then 
ESA extends only to limitations on its ownership, prohibiting such 
actions as keeping the species for commercial use187 or subjecting the 
species to interstate commerce.188 
In 1976, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard a case 
involving this rare set of circumstances. In United States v. Kepler,189 
the respondent challenged his arrest for transporting an endangered 
 
 185. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318 (Fed. Cl. 
2001). 
 186. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000). 
 187. Id. § 1538(b)(1). 
 188. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(E). 
 189. 531 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1976). 
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leopard from Florida to Kentucky, as well as the subsequent seizure 
of the animal by the Department of the Interior. The respondent 
argued that ESA was unconstitutional because its prohibition of such 
an attempted sale had the effect of taking his property without just 
compensation.190 In a per curium decision, the Sixth Circuit Court 
pointed out that ESA does allow for the transportation and sale of 
endangered species, but only for acceptable scientific and ecological 
purposes, and if permits are obtained from the Secretary.191 Kepler’s 
actions did not qualify for this exception.192 Furthermore, the court 
argued that ESA “does not effect an unconstitutional taking of 
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment because the 
statute does not prevent all sales of endangered wildlife, but only 
those sales in interstate or foreign commerce.”193 Since the court 
focused on the interstate nature of this particular case, “it is unclear 
whether the court would apply the same test to other scenarios—for 
instance, one involving only intrastate activity.”194 In the unlikely 
future event that an individual might own individual species at the 
time it is declared endangered, future courts might interpret ESA’s 
prohibition against the ownership of animals for commercial 
purposes195 as a deprivation of economically viable use and, therefore, 
a per se taking.196 
B. Endangered Species as Threats to Property 
The ESA, together with a larger regulatory scheme intended for 
the protection of wildlife, makes the ownership of endangered 
species, and subsequent regulatory takings challenges to limits on that 
property, unlikely. Far more common are situations where a 
perceived conflict exists between the public’s interest in the 
preservation of species and individual interest in a separate form of 
property. One such manifestation involves property owners 
protecting their property from species that the public has sought to 
protect. Historically, such conflicts have been quite common. 
Prior to the enactment of ESA, several cases were litigated 
seeking compensation from the government for damages done to 
 
 190. Id. at 796-97. 
 191. Id. at 797. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Fleming, supra note 67, at 528. 
 195. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(b) (2000). 
 196. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
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private property by species protected by early federal wildlife 
statutes, such as the Migratory Bird Act,197 or by state game laws.198 
The basic argument brought by property owners in such cases is 
generally that the action or inaction of a particular government entity 
has one or several consequences, including, but not limited to, failure 
to protect private property, creation of a property damaging nuisance, 
engagement in actions which result in foreseeable damages, damage 
caused by an entity which is owned by the government, and evasion 
of responsibility by the government through inaction.199 Such 
arguments, however, are unpersuasive. The courts have ruled that the 
government is not responsible for compensating damages made to 
property by protected species. A strong precedence has been 
established by the courts: Since wildlife is not property, the 
government is not responsible for the actions taken by wild animals;200 
such actions are, in fact, “incidental to the state regulation;”201 and 
legislatures make better judges of the efficacy of their wildlife 
programs, thus making them better suited to weigh the public benefits 
of wildlife protection against foreseeable property losses.202 
Such precedence proved influential when claimants challenged 
ESA in federal court, arguing that protections for endangered species 
resulted in property owners not being able to protect their property 
and they should, therefore, be compensated for their losses. This was 
the argument in Christy v. Hodel, a case in which the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals heard an argument that ESA regulations, aimed at 
protecting grizzly bears, prevented ranchers from protecting their 
sheep, thus resulting in a Fifth Amendment taking.203 In its opinion, 
the court relied heavily on a decision from the Tenth Circuit two 
years earlier, Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel.204 This 
earlier case involved an argument similar to that in Christy, but 
focused on the potential property rights impact that implementation 
 
 197. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2000); Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950); Bishop 
v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 449 (Ct. Cl. 1954). 
 198. Barrett v. New York, 220 N.Y. 423 (N.Y. 1917) (challenged that state laws protecting 
beavers resulted in damage to wooded property); Jordan v. Alaska, 681 P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1984) (challenged state game laws regarding bears resulted in a loss in property interest in 
a hunted moose carcass). 
 199. Sickman, 184 F.2d at 617-18. 
 200. Barrett, 220 N.Y. at 430; Sickman, 184 F.2d at 618. 
 201. Jordan, 681 P.2d at 350, n.3. 
 202. Barrett, 220 N.Y. at 427-28; Bishop, 126 F. Supp. at 452-53. 
 203. 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 204. 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971205 might 
impose on grazing interests. While Mountain States was not directly 
decided under ESA, it considers ESA and the Wild Horses Act to be 
analogous statutes.206 Although the court acknowledges ESA to be 
“more pervasive, more sweeping, and more restrictive,”207 the court’s 
analysis of the regulatory taking claim against the Wild Horses Act 
would still prove useful in Christy.208 
In Mountain States, the standards and tests of regulatory takings 
cases were applied directly to regulatory actions designed to protect 
certain species—in this case, wild horses—that have caused damage 
to private property. Recognizing that “[t]here is no abstract or fixed 
point at which judicial intervention under the Takings Clause 
becomes appropriate,”209 the court attempted to determine which 
direction the balance should lean between property rights in grazing 
access and public interest in wild horse protection. To do so, the court 
relied on both Agins and Penn Central criteria. To satisfy the Agins 
test, the court argued that the preservation of wild horses advances a 
legitimate state interest on aesthetic and biodiversity grounds, and 
petitioners never challenged that there was a denial of economically 
viable use. Instead, petitioners argued that the loss alone justified 
compensation.210 In applying the petitioners’ claims to the standards 
set forth in Penn Central, the court stated that the regulations and the 
subsequent economic impact on property value, when compared to 
the property as a whole, do not interfere with investment-backed 
expectations. The property owners still maintain the investment value 
of the property, and could still fence the property to keep the wild 
horses out.211 
Relying heavily on the analysis in Mountain States, the Ninth 
Circuit focused its analysis in Christy on two separate components of 
the Takings Clause: the requirements of due process and just 
compensation. The court began its due process analysis by 
determining the standard that should be applied in assessing the 
regulations prohibiting the plaintiffs from shooting grizzly bears to 
 
 205. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
 206. Mountain States, 799 F.2d at 1427-28. 
 207. Id. at 1428. 
 208. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1334-35. 
 209. Mountain States, 799 F.2d at 1429. 
 210. Id. at 1430; see also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
 211. Mountain States, 799 F.2d. at 1431. 
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protect their sheep.212 If such a prohibition allegedly violated a 
constitutionally protected right, then the standard of strict scrutiny 
would be applied. The government would need to prove that its 
pursued interest, the protection of grizzly bears, is more important 
than the plaintiffs’ property rights. If, however, the allegedly 
impinged right was less than fundamental, all the government would 
have to prove is the existence of a legitimate state end, rationally 
related to the regulation.213 
The court determined that the right in question is the “right to 
kill federally protected wildlife in defense of property,”214 which was 
determined not to be a fundamental right on two grounds. First, since 
ESA provides exceptions to its prohibitions if the person is defending 
his or her own life, or someone else’s life, but provides no such 
exception for the protection of property, Congress must not have 
considered such a property right to be as essential as a right to 
personal self defense.215 Second, “[t]he U.S. Constitution does not 
explicitly recognize a right to kill federally protected wildlife in 
defense of property.”216 While the Ninth Circuit recognized that the 
Supreme Court has inferred such constitutional rights,217 the Ninth 
Circuit also referred to an expressed reluctance on the part of the 
Supreme Court to do so.218 Ultimately, heeding “the Supreme Court’s 
admonition . . . [to] exercise restraint in creating new definitions of 
substantive due process, . . . [the Ninth Circuit] decline[d] plaintiffs’ 
invitation to construe the fifth amendment as guaranteeing the right 
to kill federally protected wildlife in defense of property.”219 
Turning to a regulatory takings analysis, the court first 
determined whether the alleged taking of property was a physical 
taking, as argued by plaintiffs, or if it was more appropriately 
understood as a potential regulatory taking, as argued by counsel for 
the Department of the Interior. The court concluded that any 
physical taking of the plaintiffs’ property in sheep was performed not 
by the state, but by the bears.220 As the government does not own the 
 
 212. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1329. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(3) (2000). 
 216. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1329. 
 217. Id. at 1330. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 218. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1330. See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 219. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1330. 
 220. Id. at 1334. 
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bears, nor is it responsible for their actions, there is no taking of 
property attributable to government actions.221 
Relying on precedence stating that property damage caused by 
protected species does not constitute a regulatory taking,222 the court 
ruled that while the goal of the Fifth Amendment is “to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole,”223 the regulations in this case do not “‘force’ plaintiffs to bear 
any burden. The losses sustained by the plaintiffs are the incidental, 
and by no means inevitable, result of reasonable regulation in the 
public interest.”224 It is the incidental nature of these regulations—that 
they regulate the taking of endangered species instead of the use of 
property—that has insulated ESA from regulatory takings claims 
founded on alleged damage done to property by protected species. 
While federal courts have not attached regulatory takings to conflicts 
concerning actions taken by property owners to protect their property 
from endangered species, one court has attached regulatory takings to 
regulations aimed at protecting endangered species from the effects 
of the use of private property.225 
C. Regulation of Property to Protect Endangered Species 
As discussed above, judicial verdicts to Commerce Clause 
challenges to ESA may be impacted by whether the court elects to 
view the regulated activity as the taking of endangered species or the 
economic activity that results in the taking.226 If the regulated activity 
is considered to be the economic activity, such as development 
construction, Congress’ authority might invasively extend to any and 
all economic activities, or ESA may prove powerless against 
noneconomic activities. Furthermore, if the regulated activity is 
considered to be the taking of protected species, then ESA may be 
interpreted as failing to achieve the substantial effects test.227 
 
 221. Id. at 1335. See also Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977). 
 222. See e.g., Barrett v. New York, 220 N.Y. 423 (N.Y. 1917); Bishop v. United States, 126 F. 
Supp. 449 (Ct. Cl. 1954); Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950); Jordan v. 
Alaska, 681 P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 
1423 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 223. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1335; Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 224. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1335. See also supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 225. Tulare Lake Basin Water Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (Fed. Cl. 2001). 
 226. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 227. Van Loh, supra note 73, at 480. 
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A similar situation is found in ESA cases involving regulatory 
takings challenges. When ESA is used to prevent the direct taking of 
an endangered species, even if that taking is to protect property, ESA 
has proven to be insulated from claims of regulatory takings: The 
regulations were incidental to the property rights, and the property 
owner still had ways to protect his or her property in ways that did 
not violate ESA.228 However, if the regulations in question are 
designed to protect the endangered species from otherwise legal 
activities involved in the use of one’s property, the incidental nature 
of the relation of the regulation to the property no longer holds. 
While the purpose of the regulation is the same, for example, to 
protect an endangered species, its impact on property is generally a 
far more central and essential component of the regulation. While 
“ESA is not a land law, . . . in many cases the only efficacious way to 
protect an endangered species is to protect habitat.”229 
This is the most conceivable form of conflict between property 
rights and endangered species. It is only in this area, where a 
judicially determined constitutional limit has been found, which 
requires compensation for property owners for losses attributed to 
enforcement of ESA. This should not be too surprising, however, 
considering that it is in this area that property interests and 
endangered species concerns are most interwoven. Congress 
recognized that such conflicts would be inevitable—that questions 
about endangered species invariably become questions about 
property—and designed ESA to at least address that concern. 
Section 5 of ESA authorizes various federal departments “to 
acquire by purchase, donation, or otherwise, lands, waters, or interest 
therein,”230 for the purpose of species protection as part of a special 
program within those agencies. Some property rights advocates have 
argued that Section 5 indicates “that Congress intended to address 
the problem of habitat modification exclusively through federal land 
acquisition.”231 According to this position, Congress had rational 
reasons for limiting ESA’s regulatory power over habitats in such a 
manner. Not only does “[e]nforcing the just compensation 
requirement always [reduce] the appetite that government officials 
 
 228. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1335. 
 229. Bruce Babbitt, ESA and Private Property: The Endangered Species Act and ‘Takings’: 
A Call for Innovation Within the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 360 (1994). 
 230. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(2) (2000). 
 231. Sweet Home Ch. of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 806 F. Supp. 279, 283 (D.D.C. 
1992); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Ch. of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995). 
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have for private property, . . . [but it also] forces government experts 
to rank the habitat for preservation in accordance with the objectives 
of its program.”232 For these reasons, regulatory takings plaintiffs 
argue that ESA regulations that limit one’s use of private property 
are “not only contrary to the spirit and intent of ESA, [but they] also 
contradict the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against government 
takings of private property for public use without payment of just 
compensation.”233 
Two recent cases tested the above argument before the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims. The first of these cases, heard by the 
Federal Claims Court in 2001, is Tulare Lake Basin Water District v. 
United States.234 Significantly, it is the first case where a federal court 
ruled that the enactment of ESA constituted a taking. The case deals 
with ESA protections for two species of fish: the delta smelt and the 
winter-run Chinook salmon.235 These species of fish rely on water 
supplies that also feed California’s private water needs. Through this 
system, the State Water Resources Control Board, the Bureau of 
Reclamations, and the state Department of Water Resources issue 
and distribute permits to county water districts.236 These permits are 
for specific water entitlement allotments, and are based on the 
contingency that the state cannot be held liable for shortages beyond 
its control.237 Not to threaten the existence of the two endangered fish 
species, the agencies adopted a “reasonable and prudent alternative” 
(“RPA”), which “restricted the time and manner in which water 
could be pumped . . . , thereby limiting the water otherwise available 
to the water distribution systems.”238 
The water districts argued “that their contractually-conferred 
right to the use of water was taken from them when the federal 
government imposed water use restrictions under the Endangered 
Species Act,”239 and sought compensation for their property in water 
rights. The court considered three arguments to determine whether 
the water districts had a compensable property interest taken from 
 
 232. Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 24-25, 
Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859), 1994 U.S. Briefs 859 (Lexis). 
 233. Brief of the Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, 
Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687 (No. 94-859), 1994 U.S. Briefs 859 (Lexis). 
 234. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (Fed. Cl. 2001). 
 235. Id. at 314. 
 236. Id. at 314-15. 
 237. Id. at 315. 
 238. Id. at 316. 
 239. Id. at 314. 
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them. First, the court asked whether the contract that the water 
districts had with the various agencies was appropriated, or simply 
frustrated.240 Next, the court determined whether any background 
principles had preempted the plaintiffs’ property title claims.241 
Finally, the court applied a Penn Central test to the economic losses 
incurred by the plaintiffs.242 
To determine what actually happened to the water district’s 
property rights upon enactment of the ESA regulations, the Claims 
Court articulated its understanding of contractual rights. This analysis 
relied heavily upon a distinction between the contract, which is an 
obligation to perform some task, and the subject matter of the 
contract, or in this case, water.243 Defendants argued that if the 
contract right “remains separate and distinct”244 from the contract’s 
subject matter, as the defendants argued was the case here, then “the 
limitations imposed by the RPA’s represent a legitimate exercise of 
federal authority that does no more than frustrate . . . plaintiff’s rights 
in water.”245 In other words, the contract only required the agencies to 
give the district access to a specified amount of water. If the water is 
not there to be accessed, the contract is still intact. 
The court, however, disagreed with this assessment. The court 
argued that the contract transferred from the state to end-users title 
for exclusive use for a specified amount of water.246 Because the 
contract was not for access to water, but for water itself, any removal 
of water from that contractually specified amount appropriates the 
contract to the state, making “plaintiff’s contract rights in the water’s 
use . . . superior to all competing interests.”247 
Defendants also argued that the plaintiffs’ contract rights, like all 
property rights, are couched in and limited by certain background 
principles of ownership, such as “the public trust doctrine, the 
doctrine of reasonable use, and common law principles of nuisance, 
all of which provide for the protection of fish and wildlife.”248 The 
 
 240. Id. at 316-17. 
 241. Id. at 317-18. 
 242. Id. at 318-20. 
 243. Id. at 317. See also Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510-11 
(1923). 
 244. Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 317. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 318. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 320. 
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court acknowledged that the rights of the districts to the use of the 
water required that they use it in a manner consistent with these 
background principles. “The difficulty with defendant’s argument, 
however, is that the water allocation scheme . . . specifically allowed 
for the allocations of water defendant now seeks to deem 
unreasonable.”249 Framing its argument in terms of judicial deference, 
the court stated that if the water allotments had to be lowered to keep 
the districts’ water usage from harming the endangered fish or 
violating certain background principles of ownership, it would be up 
to the agencies to make that determination and, most importantly, 
put it in the contract. The agency, however, did neither.250 
Although the court set out to assess the plaintiffs’ loss of water 
rights via a Penn Central analysis focusing specifically on the 
regulations’ economic impact and interference with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations,251 such analysis was never performed 
because the court found such an analysis to be unnecessary.252 The 
court determined the case involved a physical taking, which is 
accompanied by a different set of Fifth Amendment requirements 
than a regulatory taking. When a court determines that a regulation 
that limits the use of private property functionally amounts to a 
physical taking of the property, compensation has often been 
required, regardless of the extent to which public ends are met.253 
“The regulatory taking doctrine, on the other hand, applies to 
government actions that prevent a property owner from making a 
particular use of his or her property that otherwise would be 
permissible.”254 
The Claims Court was presented with arguments to consider this 
case under a regulatory takings doctrine. These arguments against the 
application of the physical taking per se rule focused on two Penn 
Central factors: the limited reasonable expectations a contract holder 
could have in light of regulatory background principles, and the less-
than-complete economic losses suffered by the plaintiffs.255 This 
argument for the defendants highlighted that the federal government 
 
 249. Id. at 321. 
 250. Id. at 324. 
 251. Id. at 318. 
 252. Id. at 318-20. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Brief of the Natural Heritage Institute & the Environmental Law Foundation as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Defendants at 30, Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (No. 98-101L). 
 255. Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 318. 
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did not “[assert] a proprietary interest in the water . . . in derogation of 
all other private interests,” but instead “merely regulated the timing 
and rate of . . . [the] appropriation of water,” which left the plaintiffs 
with the ability “to use the remainder of those rights ‘in gainful 
fashion.’”256 
While defendants argued that “[a] usufructuary interest in water 
is simply not susceptible to physical possession, much less invasion or 
occupation,”257 the court sided with plaintiffs on this issue by stating 
that, “[i]n the context of water rights, a mere restriction on use—the 
hallmark of a regulatory action—completely eviscerates the right 
itself since plaintiffs’ sole entitlement is to the use of the water.”258 
Even though the economic loss suffered by the contract holder was “a 
fraction of the master contract’s overall value,”259 the court held that 
“the government has essentially substituted itself as the beneficiary of 
the contract rights with regard to that water and totally displaced the 
contract holder.”260 The court’s application of a physical taking status 
to Tulare Lake, and with it a categorical granting of the right to 
compensation, demonstrates the key role that the determination of 
property baselines plays in regulatory takings cases. 
One issue discussed in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, but not fully 
explored, was how courts should interpret the base property from 
which regulations appropriate in cases involving regulatory takings, 
or as the Court puts it, determining “what is the proper denominator 
in the takings fraction.”261 At issue in Palazzolo was whether 
regulations that would not allow development in wetland parcels of 
property could result in a Lucas per se taking of the entirety of that 
portion of the property, or whether allowable construction on upland 
portions must be included, thus preventing claims of an economic 
wipeout. In Palazzolo, the majority opinion states that the remaining 
presence of the upland section prevents a ruling of a categorical 
taking.262 This approach remains consistent with the Court’s 
traditional jurisprudence regarding property baselines in takings 
cases, which “does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments 
 
 256. Brief of the Natural Heritage Institution, supra note 254, at 32-33 (quoting Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978)). 
 257. Id. at 31. 
 258. Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319. 
 259. Id. at 318-19. 
 260. Id. at 319 (emphasis added). 
 261. 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001). 
 262. Id. 
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and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have 
been entirely abrogated.”263  The Tulare Lake court, however, viewed 
the property claim abrogated by the government as separate from the 
water rights as a whole, which is an essential component to the court’s 
physical taking construction.264 
The second case to bring a regulatory takings challenge to 
property controlling regulations of ESA is currently waiting to be 
heard before the Court of Federal Claims. As mentioned above, the 
2003 Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in GDF Realty 
Investments  v. Norton found that FWS regulation of intrastate cave 
species was consistent with Congress’ Commerce Clause power.265 
While the plaintiffs in GDF Realty failed to convince the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals with their Commerce Clause challenge, that 
challenge was one of two challenges made by the plaintiffs to the 
federal courts regarding this specific conflict. Apart from challenging 
ESA’s implementation as beyond the scope of Congress’ commerce 
powers, the plaintiffs also challenged the implementation as an 
uncompensated and unconstitutional taking of their property.266 
On May 10, 2004, the Court of Federal Claims ordered this case 
stayed pending final resolution of the Commerce Clause challenge 
discussed above.267 After the Fifth Circuit ruled that the government’s 
actions passed Commerce Clause scrutiny, the plaintiffs appealed the 
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. Their petition for a writ of 
certiorari was denied on June 13, 2005.268 With that judicial obstacle 
out of the way, the Court of Federal Claims can proceed with hearing 
arguments for and against compensation for the economic impacts of 
the FWS’s implementation of ESA to protect six species of 
subterranean invertebrates. 
VI.  ASSESSING THE SUSTAINABILITY OF REGULATORY TAKINGS 
CHALLENGES TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
Although regulatory takings challenges to ESA have been 
incredibly rare,269 the sudden success of the challenge in Tulare Lake, 
 
 263. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
 264. Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319. 
 265. 326 F.3d 622, 643-44 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 266. Id. at 626-27. 
 267. GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, No. 99-CV-513 (Fed. Cl. 2004). 
 268. GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 125 S. Ct. 2898, 2899 (2005). 
 269. Babbit, supra note 229, at 360 (Former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, reacting 
to allegations of “egregious abuse” under ESA, expressed some surprise that as of 1994 “there 
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combined with the future hearing of GDF Realty, indicates a possible 
shift in that trend. If the sudden emergence of two cases in one court 
indicates a change in litigious strategies aimed at challenging the 
implementation of ESA, then two questions arise. First, why, only 
after more than thirty years of enforcement, during a time span that 
overlaps the above described evolution of regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, are regulatory takings challenges being made? Second, 
how successful could such challenges eventually be? 
The short answer to the first question could focus on the sporadic 
nature of regulatory takings jurisprudence, which the Supreme Court 
itself has described as lacking any kind of set formula.270 The resulting 
uncertainty may have motivated property owners who have felt 
unduly inconvenienced by ESA to pursue more certain legal avenues. 
Such an explanation, though, does nothing to explain why regulatory 
takings challenges have frequently occurred in other areas. This 
section will focus on both of those questions, paying special attention 
to the facts in the upcoming GDF Realty challenge. 
A. Agins Criteria 
The two-pronged Agins test has not experienced the same degree 
of judicial popularity as the Penn Central test, and the Supreme Court 
has recently ruled that the “substantially advances” component of 
Agins suggests a means/ends testing inconsistent with the inquiry into 
whether property has been taken.271 This ruling thus indicates that the 
Court will likely utilize the Penn Central test in future cases involving 
less than total diminishment of property value through regulation.272 
The possibility does remain, however, that the Court could be asked 
to evaluate property use regulations, wherein “the failure of a 
regulation to accomplish a stated or obvious objective would be 
relevant”273 to general property rights challenges to the government’s 
authority to enact specific property restrictions. Although now 
considered outside the realm of regulatory takings determinations, 
challenges to the asserted public purpose of ESA implementation 
could still remain as parts of a larger property rights movement 
against ESA.  
 
has not been a single case filed in that [Federal Claims] court alleging a taking under the 
ESA.”). 
 270. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 271. Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2005). 
 272. Id. at 2078. 
 273. Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
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The second component requires that the property owner not be 
deprived of the economically viable use of his or her property.274 
While not possessing the same constitutional certainty as the public 
use requirement, the creation by the Supreme Court of the per se 
taking in Lucas has created a judicial commitment to the principle 
that total economic wipeouts caused by regulation of the property be 
compensated “no matter how minute the intrusion, no matter how 
weighty the public purpose behind it.”275 In light of ESA precedence 
and practice, implementation of the statute should be fairly well 
insulated from the Agins test. 
One thing that the ongoing Commerce Clause challenges to ESA 
may have accomplished is the establishment of a strong precedence 
defending ESA as substantially advancing a public purpose. 
Regardless of the type of regulatory takings challenge brought before 
a court, past rulings on ESA have strongly supported the idea that the 
protection of endangered species serves a public purpose. The 
findings in NAHB, Gibbs, Rancho Viejo, and GDF Realty that ESA is 
consistent with the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution 
strongly support the argument that the Act serves a public purpose. 
This is significant because public purpose scrutiny is less stringent 
than Commerce Clause scrutiny, which additionally requires meeting 
the substantial effects test.276 Furthermore, in Tulare Lake, which 
required compensation for the implementation of ESA, the Claims 
Court held the public purpose of ESA as a given, choosing not to 
question “whether the federal government has the authority to 
protect . . . [the species], but whether it may impose the costs of their 
protection solely on plaintiffs.”277 
Despite strong judicial precedence for the public purpose behind 
ESA, particular regulations are still subject to the question of 
whether they substantially advance that purpose, which is a 
determination that can only be made on a case by case basis. The 
facts in the GDF Realty case are consistent with the Agins 
requirement that regulations substantially advance a legitimate state 
interest. The Fifth Circuit found a strong public and state interest 
when it heard the case, arguing that a taking of the species could 
impact biodiversity and research interests,278 and there should be no 
 
 274. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138. 
 275. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 276. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-567 (1995). 
 277. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 316 (2001). 
 278. GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 639 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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doubt that the proposed restrictions would substantially advance that 
interest. 
To fully pass the Agins test, a regulation must also not deny the 
owner economically viable use of his or her property. While 
conditions are imaginable whereby the only available options that 
could protect an endangered species involve ceasing all economic 
activity on an individual’s property, such situations are actually less 
likely to occur, given Congress’ addition of Section 10 provisions for 
incidental takes. Section 10 allows FWS to issue permits to property 
owners that allow for economic activity and incidental takes of 
endangered species, provided that a Habitat Conservation Plan 
(“HCP”) limits both such takes and economic activity to sustainable 
levels.279 Such provisions, which are designed to accommodate both 
economic and biological interests, serve as a statutory directive to 
avoid situations where economic viability is completely eradicated. 
These provisions were also in place in the GDF Realty conflict. 
The facts of the case indicate that implementation of an HCP was a 
possibility, because the plaintiffs were notified by the agency that the 
property “could be developed without causing a take if development, 
among other things, [was] scaled back from the canyons, and surface 
and subsurface drainage and nutrient exchange [was] provided for.”280 
This would indicate that the ESA regulations put in place to protect 
the cave species would still allow for some construction and, 
therefore, not deny the owner of some economically viable use. 
One issue that could greatly impact this component of the Agins 
test as it is applied to ESA is the question of the baseline discussed 
above. In the GDF Realty case, the property involved consisted of 216 
acres, six of which were deeded for conservation purposes.281 When 
the plaintiffs’ incidental take permits were denied by FWS, it was on 
the grounds that “FWS decided that the deeded preserves were 
inadequate to protect the Cave Species.”282 Combined with the 
potential HCP provisions described above, these statements draw a 
picture of a conflict wherein the participants are going back and forth, 
trying to determine how big of a chunk they can secure for their 
interests. 
 
 279. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2000). 
 280. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 626. 
 281. Id. at 624-25. 
 282. Id. at 626. 
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When that determination would be made, the court would have 
to decide where to draw the baseline: How much of the original 216 
acres should be counted as plaintiff’s property? If the Claims Court 
declares the original 216 acres as the property baseline, and the 
plaintiffs are allowed economic use of more than just a token amount 
of that property, then the Agins test will be passed. If, however, the 
Claims Court only considers the property that plaintiffs were not 
allowed to develop, then the ESA regulations will likely fail Agins. If 
the Claims Court follows Palazzolo, the developable property should 
not be ignored in determining “the proper denominator in the takings 
fraction.”283 
B. Penn Central Criteria 
The three-pronged Penn Central test has been more commonly 
used by the courts in regulatory takings cases, as most cases deal with 
“a regulation [that] places limitations on land that fall short of 
eliminating all economically beneficial use, [in which] a taking 
nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of 
factors.”284 The first prong of the Penn Central test looks to the 
economic impact that a regulation imposes upon individual property 
owners.285 Generally speaking, the higher the economic impact, the 
more likely a court will rule that the particular regulation comes with 
a cost that, out of a sense of fairness, should be carried by the tax 
paying public.286 
Combined with this focus on the economic nature of property 
controlling regulations, any interference with investment-backed 
expectations also increases the likelihood of a finding of a regulatory 
taking.287 These expectations, however, must meet a standard of 
reasonableness, shaped in part, albeit not determined, by the common 
law and existing regulations.288 
 
 283. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001). 
 284. Id. at 617. 
 285. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“The economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant, and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant 
considerations.”) (citations omitted). 
 286. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960) (holding that the total 
destruction by the government of all value of privately held property has every possible element 
of a Fifth Amendment taking). 
 287. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 288. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632-35 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the 
regulatory regime in place shapes the reasonableness of the owner’s expectations.). 
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Lastly, a court using a Penn Central analysis must also consider 
the nature of the government’s action, which distinguishes between 
legitimate government actions taken with the aim of serving the 
public good, and “a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a 
particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the 
neighboring ones.”289 Of course, each of these prongs still carries with 
it a degree of ambiguity, and the courts have not been particularly 
clear in stating what is meant by each factor, how they are weighted, 
and how they relate to one another.290 Due to this ambiguity, as 
opposed to in spite of it, a regulatory takings challenge to ESA 
analyzed under Penn Central certainly has a chance of success that 
should not be ignored. 
Without a doubt, implementation of ESA can be costly. Costs 
associated with HCP’s, which must be imposed upon either private 
individuals or the public as a whole, can potentially cost hundreds of 
millions of dollars.291 When those impacts intersect with the economic 
investment-backed expectations of the property owner, the likelihood 
increases that the Penn Central criteria for a regulatory taking will be 
met. Much of this strongly hinges on the case by case variance in facts. 
In the upcoming GDF Realty case, these factors will likely have a 
strong influence on the outcome. The property in question in GDF 
Realty was purchased in 1983 while the listing of five of the six cave 
species did not occur until 1988, and the sixth was listed in 1993.292 The 
Claims Court, in this particular situation, may be sympathetic to the 
plaintiffs’ argument, interpreting the situation as a case of investment 
with reasonable expectations thwarted by subsequent regulations. 
The Claims Court’s reading of Palazzolo could prove influential on 
this point. Although the chronological relationship between the 
moments of property acquisition and regulation creation is not at 
issue in GDF Realty, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
investment-backed expectations in Palazzolo is related. The majority 
decision in Palazzolo, authored by Justice Kennedy, posits property 
rights as so fundamental that a simple “post-enactment transfer of 
title” should not deprive the latter owner of his or her “right to 
challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.”293 
 
 289. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 132. 
 290. Peterson, supra note 135, at 1317 (1989). 
 291. See, e.g., Robert Innes, Takings, Compensation and Endangered Species Protection on 
Private Lands, 12 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 35, 35-36 (1998). 
 292. GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 293. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627. 
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Even under such absolutist terms, however, property rights still 
remain “subject to the reasonable exercise of state authority, 
including the enforcement of valid zoning and land-use 
restrictions.”294 
Concerned that the judicial scales might be tipped too far in the 
direction of either of these values, Justice O’Connor issued a 
concurring opinion in Palazzolo emphasizing that the timing of 
regulations were neither “dispositive” nor “talismanic” of economic 
expectations.295 O’Connor ultimately concluded that the Palazzolo 
decision “does not remove the regulatory backdrop against which an 
owner takes title to property from the purview of the Penn Central 
inquiry. It simply restores balance to that inquiry.”296 The fact that the 
plaintiffs in GDF Realty purchased the property in a regulatory 
regime absent any regulations on species on that property certainly 
lends credence to the claim that their reasonable investment-backed 
expectations were thwarted. However, the fact that the property was 
purchased in a regulatory regime containing background principles 
limiting property rights to protect endangered species, in general, 
certainly contextualizes those expectations. 
The final component of the Penn Central test—an assessment of 
the nature of the government’s action—is intended to protect owners 
of private property from their property unjustly “being pressed into 
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious 
public harm.”297 Like the two previous economic factors, this third 
factor is contingent upon the facts of each particular case. However, 
the nature of government actions factor may present a more daunting 
hurdle than the two previous factors, especially for ESA regulations 
facing regulatory takings challenges. 
ESA sparks much heated debate from those on both sides of the 
issue. In addition, property conflicts spark equally charged public 
responses, as evidence by the recent public and media outcry over the 
Supreme Court’s Kelo v. New London298 decision, which has been 
 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 296. Id. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 297. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992). See also Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (noting that the character of the governmental 
action is one of the factors relevant in considering whether public action taken by the 
government must compensate economic injuries); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 350 (2002) (quoting Lucas). 
 298. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
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excessively, and in a manner devoid of nuance, referred to as 
“disturbing,”299 “a decision that makes it too easy for the government 
to seize your bedroom,”300 and “another giant step toward classical 
corporatism or fascism in America.”301 Together, these policy issues, 
both of which are already susceptible to being interpreted as 
fundamentally connected to government intrusion by public opinion, 
easily raise calls for heightened judicial scrutiny of government 
actions. 
The facts presented in GDF Realty before the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals provide not only a good example of the category of 
behavior on which the third prong of the Penn Central test focuses, 
but also grounds on which the Claims Court could base a finding for a 
regulatory taking. The facts in this case revealed FWS acting in a 
highly suspicious manner. After the plaintiffs filed for incidental take 
permits, and after FWS had determined that the areas reserved to 
protect the species were insufficient, the plaintiffs were notified by 
FWS that their permits would not be approved. The final denials, 
however, were never issued, leaving the issue unripe for challenge.302 
The denials were only declared issued de facto in the District Court, 
which “admonished FWS for delaying the denials when it had never 
intended to grant the permits.”303 While the facts still may be 
presented differently in the upcoming trial before the Claims Court, 
the presence of a judicial record portraying FWS as an agency using 
stall and delay tactics to avoid having their decisions challenged 
increases the likelihood that the Claims Court will find the 
government’s actions of a nature sufficient to fail Penn Central. These 
events also affect a potential ripeness ruling, which must be met 
before Agins or Penn Central become relevant. 
C. Ripeness 
As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has established a 
ripeness doctrine for cases dealing with regulatory takings, requiring 
 
 299. Robert Trigaux, Your Home Could Be up for Grabs, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 24, 
2005, at D1. 
 300. Debra J. Saunders, Your Home Could Be Pfizer’s Castle, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., 
June 30, 2005, at B9. 
 301. Edward Hudgins, Your Castle No More, WASH. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A20. 
 302. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348-351 (1986) 
(requiring a final administrative decision before a challenge can be considered ripe); GDF 
Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the lack of a final 
denial from FWS prevented plaintiffs from challenging FWS’s action). 
 303. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 626. 
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that a case is not ripe for review unless it deals with a concrete 
controversy304 and the particular agency has administered its final 
decision.305 While such criteria may seem straight forward, there is still 
a great deal of ambiguity in those terms. Much of that ambiguity has 
been demonstrated in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 
In Palazzolo, the Court found the case to be ripe, although the 
state agency had not issued a final decision regarding the amount of 
allowable construction. The agency had made it clear that no wetland 
construction would be allowed and “federal ripeness rules do not 
require the submission of further and futile applications with other 
agencies.”306 This rule is called the “futility exception,” and it removes 
the necessity of seeking subsequent decisions when an initial decision 
“makes it clear that no project will be approved.”307 
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court ruled that the case was not ripe, 
despite the length in time needed by the regional planning committee, 
during which no construction could occur. The Court ruled that to 
simultaneously require the fundamental rules of ripeness, including 
awaiting the final decision, with a requirement to compensate 
property owners for the time, “would create a perverse system of 
incentives.”308 The ripeness doctrine does allow for delays in the 
agency decisionmaking process, requiring compensation only for 
“extraordinary delays.”309 While this rule helps to clarify the 
relationship between time and ripeness, it is still open to 
interpretation, demonstrated by the dissent in Tahoe-Sierra that 
argued that “a ban on all development lasting almost six years does 
not resemble any traditional land-use planning device.”310 
The ripeness doctrine also plays a significant role in regulatory 
takings cases involving ESA. In 2004, the Court of Appeals for the 
 
 304. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981). See also 
Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 18 (1988) (clarifying that premature claims may not be 
considered on the merits, while the relevant regulations or statutes themselves may be 
challenged as facially unconstitutional). 
 305. See Williamson County Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985) 
(overturning jury decision in favor of respondent because the taking claim lacked ripeness in the 
absence of a final administrative decision); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 351. 
 306. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001). 
 307. S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 504 (9th Cir. 1990); Heck v. 
United States, 134 F.3d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 308. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 340 (2002). 
 309. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 310. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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Federal Circuit heard Morris v. U.S.311 on appeal from the Court of 
Federal Claims. In this case, the plaintiffs had purchased a half-acre 
lot in Northern California, adjacent to a river, with the plans of 
harvesting six old-growth redwood trees. The plaintiffs asserted “that 
this is the property’s only economically viable use.”312 After being told 
by the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) that they should 
obtain incidental take permits in the event that the harvesting of the 
trees impacted endangered fish species, the plaintiffs determined that 
the application cost exceeded the value of the property and filed suit, 
arguing that the required permit process effectively took their 
property.313 The court found the taking claim unripe; not only had the 
agency not issued a final decision about the costs involved, but the 
plaintiffs also had not availed themselves to remaining administrative 
remedies.314 In particular, NMFS has the discretion to provide 
technical assistance in the incidental take permitting process and the 
HCP process, leaving the final application cost “unknowable until the 
agency has had some meaningful opportunity to exercise its discretion 
to assist in the process.”315 
In the GDF Realty case, the ripeness doctrine has already played 
a role. Prior to the cases involving the endangered cave species, the 
same plaintiffs, on the same piece of property, challenged FWS 
regulations on their property, this time concerning two species of 
birds: the black-capped vireo and the golden-cheeked warbler.316 The 
plaintiffs argued that they did not need to apply for an incidental take 
permit to develop their property, because the development of their 
property would not result in a taking of the species.317 Relying on the 
Williamson County requirement of a final administrative decision, the 
District Court determined that FWS had not been able to issue its 
final decision as to whether a take would occur, and the court was not 
prepared to do that job for FWS.318 Furthermore, the court stated 
that, if the plaintiffs were right, and their actions were not a danger to 
the endangered species, “then no ‘case or controversy’ is before this 
 
 311. 392 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 312. Id. at 1374. 
 313. Id. at 1374-75. 
 314. Id. at 1376-77. 
 315. Id. at 1377. 
 316. Four Points Utility Joint Venture v. United States, 40 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1509, 
1510 (W.D. Tex. 1994). 
 317. See id. at 1511 (noting that it is not the role of a United States District Court to make 
final administrative decisions). 
 318. Id. 
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Court, as is required by Article III of the Constitution.”319 This also 
would have violated the Hodel requirement for a “concrete 
controversy.”320 
Furthermore, in this District Court case, the plaintiffs alleged 
that FWS “attempted to prevent the development by coercion and by 
threatening criminal penalties if a ‘take’ occurs.”321 As noted above, 
this same court criticized FWS for refusing to issue final permit 
decisions.322 While such information may construct the nature of the 
government’s action in an unfavorable light, this case also 
demonstrates that the conflict between the two parties has been 
exceptionally confrontational. 
As far as the ripeness of GDF Realty is concerned, the result will 
hinge on whether the Claims Court determines that FWS has issued 
its final decision. FWS has stated that development can occur on the 
property, provided that canyon areas and drainage concerns are 
addressed.323 The permit application made by plaintiffs, however, was 
denied on the basis of inadequate deeded preserves.324 The higher the 
level of disparity between these two plans, the less likely the case will 
be considered ripe. While FWS has stated what sort of property 
development would be permissible, the plaintiffs must approach that 
goal meaningfully. The further apart these two proposals are, the less 
likely the Claims Court will conclude that sufficient conversation has 
occurred between the plaintiffs and the agency administration to 
determine “how far the regulation goes.”325 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Given the “essentially ad hoc, factual”326 bases on which 
regulatory takings jurisprudence rests, it is difficult to determine 
exactly how “courts [will] apply the abstract legal rules and principles 
currently at play in regulatory takings case” to the “tangible, often 
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 323. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 626. 
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fragile realm”327 of diverse ecosystems, interacting with diverse 
property interests. The ways that courts rule on various regulatory 
takings challenges to the Endangered Species Act will depend not 
only on the specific facts of each case, but also on the divergent ways 
in which judges can apply the rules of regulatory takings 
jurisprudence to those facts. Ultimately, little advice can be given to 
regulatory agencies on how to avoid such takings challenges. Apart 
from tempering the nature of the government’s actions to satisfy part 
of Penn Central, or delaying just enough to postpone the ripeness of a 
case, most of the other factors are economic in nature, and those 
components vary from case to case. Judges, in fact, have more control 
over the economic impacts of regulatory takings cases, where they 
have a degree of flexibility in defining investment-backed 
expectations and the property baseline. 
Another factor that must be considered here is the set of various 
political factors affecting regulatory takings cases and jurisprudence. 
Apart from the more obvious factors, such as the political ideologies 
of appointed judges and executive branch administrators, the latter of 
which partially determines the level of activity pursued by the 
agencies in charge of implementing ESA, one should also consider 
the role of litigation based interest groups. Groups on both sides of 
any issue help to determine the frequency and manner in which such 
challenges come to the courts. Since the groups that represent 
plaintiffs’ interests, however, are closer to the facts of the conflict and 
involved with the parties more directly, their influence is likely to be 
greater. 
In 1995, when the Supreme Court heard Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home,328 several groups filed amicus briefs for both petitioners and 
respondents. The case before the Court dealt only with the definition 
of “harm,” but property rights challenges were present in plaintiffs’ 
discussion on Section 5 land acquisitions.329 Of the briefs filed on 
behalf of the plaintiffs, all of them addressed regulatory takings 
jurisprudence and precedence.330 Of all the groups to file amicus briefs 
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Lack of Clarity, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 353, 354 (2004). 
 328. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Ch. of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 329. Id. at 700-01. 
 330. See, e.g., Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 233, at 30-31 (arguing that 
FWS’s regulations violate the Fifth Amendment). Other groups filing briefs supporting 
respondents as Amici Curiae include: Institute for Justice, Florida Legal Foundation, 
Southeastern Legal Foundation, and Mountain States Legal Foundation. 
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on behalf of FWS, only one addressed regulatory takings arguments 
in a manner that addressed the legal components of the debate.331 
While interest groups seeking judicially imposed limitations on ESA 
have historically chosen tactics other than the use of regulatory 
takings challenges, that tactic has long been one part of a multifaceted 
argument put forward by those groups. Shifts in the political 
environment, including, but not limited to, the appointment of 
justices with property rights-based interpretations of the takings 
jurisprudence, public backlash to perceived threats to private 
property, or a salient case with facts favorable to a regulatory takings 
interpretation, have the potential to make regulatory takings a far 
more commonly used tool against the Endangered Species Act. 
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